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Abstract 
This chapter argues that the international copyright system, which is 
now embedded in the international trading system as a consequence of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement), has 
operated at least in relation to some types of copyright-protected 
“cultural goods and services” (as defined in the 2005 UNESCO 
Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions) as a fetter on cultural diversity and self-determination.  
This effect has been produced by certain aspects of copyright law itself 
allied with aspects of behaviour in the global market for “cultural 
goods and services”.  The chapter analyses the extent to which these 
fettering effects have been exacerbated by other WTO agreements.  It 
then considers whether or not the WTO system can be regarded as 
being in conflict with the emerging international regime for the 
protection of cultural diversity as embodied in the 2005 UNESCO 
Convention. 
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1 Introduction 
 
This paper considers the relationship between the international legal 
regime for protecting cultural diversity and the international copyright 
system, which is now embedded within the law of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  In order to examine this relationship, the chapter 
looks at six issues.  First, in Section 2 it considers the treatment of the 
concept of cultural diversity in international law in light of the 
UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions.  In this section it is suggested that 
the UNESCO Convention may be regarded as articulating and building 
upon rights previously laid down in the human rights covenants to the 
Charter of the United Nations, with the consequence that the concept 
of cultural diversity is invested with human rights credentials.  As a 
basis for arguing that some relationship should exist between the 
UNESCO Convention and the copyright system, Section 3 offers some 
views on the extent to which the concept of culture in the UNESCO 
Convention interacts with the concept of culture with which copyright 
is concerned.  The chapter then turns to a more detailed analysis of the 
relationship between copyright and cultural diversity in Section 4, 
followed in Section 5 by a consideration of the extent to which the 
entrenching of the international copyright system in the WTO has 
affected this relationship.  Section 6 broadens this consideration by 
arguing that other provisions of WTO law exacerbate the negative 
effects of the international copyright system on cultural diversity.  
Finally, in Section 7, the chapter comments upon the extent to which 
there is a clash between the “human right” to cultural diversity, if it 
exists, and the international copyright system. 
 
 
2 Cultural diversity as a concept in international law? 
 
A discourse exists in the instruments of public international law 
suggesting, at least, the valorization of cultural diversity.  This 
discourse can be observed, for example, from the composite effect of a 
range of provisions found in the human rights covenants to the Charter 
of the United Nations.
1
  While these provisions are more properly 
concerned with questions of cultural self-determination, it is clear that 
this necessarily carries with it a concern to preserve diverse cultural 
identities.  A more explicit engagement with the concept of cultural 
diversity arrived in the form of the UNESCO Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions of 
2005.
2
  While the relationship between the Covenants to the Charter of 
the United Nations and the UNESCO Convention is not made explicit, 
                                                 
1
 See the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Arts 1, 19 & 27; Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Art 15. 
2
 In accordance with the UNESCO Convention, Article 29, which provides that it enters into force 
three months after the date of deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession, the Convention entered into force on 18 March 2007. 
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it is evident from both its Preamble and its operative provisions that the 
UNESCO Convention firmly lodges itself within the human rights 
camp, even it does not go so far as to create a new human right.
3
  So 
far as the Preamble is concerned, amongst an enormous list of other 
things, it declares itself to be, in the words of the first five paragraphs: 
Affirming that cultural diversity is a defining characteristic of 
humanity, 
Conscious that cultural diversity forms a common heritage of humanity 
and should be cherished and preserved for the benefit of all, 
Being aware that cultural diversity creates a rich and varied world, 
which increases the range of choices and nurtures human capacities 
and values, and therefore is a mainspring for sustainable development 
for communities, peoples, and nations, 
Recalling that cultural diversity, flourishing within a framework of 
democracy, tolerance, social justice and mutual respect between 
peoples and cultures, is indispensable for peace and security at the 
local, national and international levels, 
Celebrating, the importance of cultural diversity for the full realization 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in other universally 
recognized instruments 
 
The location of the Convention within the stable of human rights 
instruments, which is suggested in the Preamble is reinforced by a 
number of the operative provisions of the Convention.  Two such 
provisions are of particular note in this respect.  One is the first of the 
Convention’s so-called guiding principles in Article 2.1, which 
provides: 
Cultural diversity can be protected and promoted only if human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression, information 
and communication, as well as the ability of individuals to choose 
cultural expressions, are guaranteed.  No one may invoke the 
provisions of this Convention in order to infringe human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights or guaranteed by international law, or to limit the scope 
thereof. 
The other relevant article, however, provides the clearest invocation of 
the authority and relevance of the pre-existing human rights 
instruments.  This is Article 5.1, which is concerned with the 
obligations of the parties to the Convention: 
The Parties, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, the 
principles of international law and universally recognized human rights 
instruments, reaffirm their sovereign right to formulate and implement 
their cultural policies and to adopt measures to protect and promote the 
diversity of cultural expressions and to strengthen international 
cooperation to achieve the purposes of this Convention. 
 
                                                 
3
 For an assessment of the relationship between the UNESCO Convention and existing international 
human rights obligations, see Graber 2006, at 560-563. 
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By drawing together the various strands from pre-existing international 
law, the UNESCO Convention may be conceptualised as a particular, 
if rather Byzantine, instantiation of the right to cultural self-
determination.  Certainly, it gives more concrete form to the idea that 
the promotion and protection of cultural diversity should be the subject 
of international legal obligations.  But is this new form likely to be 
more successful than its forerunners in counterbalancing the effects of 
the international copyright system, which is now so firmly entrenched 
within the system of international economic law operating under the 
auspices of the WTO? 
 
 
3 The Concept of “Culture” 
 
Before moving on to the question of the operation and effect of 
copyright in the arena of cultural diversity, it is necessary to put some 
flesh on the bones of the concept of “culture” with which the UNESCO 
convention is concerned.  In fact, there is a great deal of flesh to play 
around with here: “culture” being a totalizing concept of enormous 
potential width and diversity.
4
  The UNESCO Convention attempts to 
give form to the concept of culture with which it is concerned, 
although it is noticeable that its definitions, which are found in Article 
4, involve some circularity because they all invoke the notion of 
culture in order to define it.  This, possibly inevitable, circularity is not 
the only indication that the drafters of the Convention experienced 
considerable difficulty pinning down the central concept with which 
they were concerned.
5
  It is also evident that each attempt at definition 
gives rise to other definitional problems that call for further elucidation 
(and circularity).  Article 4 of the Convention defines its central 
concept of “cultural diversity” as “the manifold ways in which cultures 
and groups and societies find expression”, including “diverse modes of 
artistic creation, production, dissemination, distribution and enjoyment, 
whatever the means and technologies used”.  “Cultural content” is “the 
symbolic meaning, artistic dimension, and cultural values that originate 
from or express cultural identities”.  “Cultural expressions … result 
from the creativity of individuals, groups and societies, and … have 
cultural content”.  Article 4 also deals with the more concrete aspects 
of cultural expressions.  It defines “cultural activities, goods and 
services” as those that “embody or convey cultural expressions, 
irrespective of the commercial value they may have”.  Cultural 
activities are, however, distinguished from cultural goods and services 
on the basis that they “may be an end in themselves, or they may 
contribute to the production of cultural goods and services”.  The 
production and distribution of these cultural goods and services may be 
undertaken by “cultural industries”. 
 
                                                 
4
 See, eg, Sider 1986, at 6, cited in Blake 2000, at 67-68. 
5
 However, for a more generous assessment of Art 4, see Graber 2006, at 558. 
 5 
The interest manifested by the Convention in the production of cultural 
goods and services by cultural industries suggests a clear, if 
unarticulated, link with copyright law.  While it is clear that copyright 
would not apply to the full range of cultural expressions and activities 
with which the Convention is concerned, there is a reasonably marked 
overlap between those things that would appear to fall within the 
definition of cultural goods and services in the Convention and the 
range of works protected by copyright law.  As is envisaged in the 
Convention, this also raises the question of the role of the cultural 
industries in the copyright arena.  Of course, the cultural industries are 
not involved in the production of all the cultural goods and services 
protected by copyright.  Indeed, on the creative side much production 
is done by individuals or groups that would hardly feel comfortable 
with the sobriquet “cultural industry”.6  On the other hand, there are 
some copyright cultural goods and services that are more obviously the 
product of the cultural industries, the clearest example of these being 
films and broadcasts, which rely on the collaboration of a wide range 
of creative activities under the auspices of a “cultural industry”.  One 
might also argue that the production of a book or a CD in a 
commercially available form is a collaboration between the 
quintessential artist in the garret and a publisher, the latter of which 
might reasonably be described as being part of a cultural industry.  
Even where the cultural industries cannot be said to be involved in the 
production of copyright goods and services, they have a clear role in 
their distribution.  These roles of the cultural industries in the 
production and distribution of certain types of cultural goods and 
services are subject to generous protection by copyright law.  This 
protection sits alongside, often uncomfortably, the protection that 
copyright offers to individual creators.  The ensuing tension between 
creative or cultural interests and business interests lies at the heart of 
copyright’s relationship with the concept of cultural diversity. 
 
 
4 Copyright and Culture 
 
The international copyright system, which is now embedded in the 
international trading system as a consequence of the World Trade 
Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects on Intellectual 
Property (TRIPs Agreement), has operated at least in relation to some 
types of copyright protected “cultural goods and services” as a fetter 
on creativity and cultural diversity.  This effect has been produced by 
certain aspects of copyright law itself, allied with aspects of behaviour 
in the market for “cultural goods and services”. 
 
So far as copyright law is concerned the threat that it poses to cultural 
diversity and self-determination is a consequence of the process by 
which it commodifies and instrumentalises the cultural outputs with 
which it is concerned.  There are five interdependent aspects of 
                                                 
6
 For a discussion of the expression “cultural industry”, see Throsby 2008. 
 6 
copyright law that have been essential to this process.  The first and 
most basic tool of commodification is the alienability of the copyright 
interest.  This is a critical factor in the context of this paper and arises 
as a consequence of the fact that copyright law operates on the basis of 
a distinction between the author of copyright works and the owner of 
those works.  While the author maintains some symbolic significance 
in copyright law,
7
 the rights conferred by copyright are enjoyed by its 
owners.  Sometimes authorship and ownership coincide.  Authors of 
literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works are usually the first 
owners of the copyright in those works; and film directors typically 
have a share of the copyright interest.
8
  However, at least in the Anglo-
American system, these interests can be freely transferred by contract.  
Thus, it is frequently the case that authors of copyright works come 
under pressure to transfer their copyright to those who are making an 
investment in the distribution of the works, such as publishers, and 
music and film production companies.  In other words, it is the practice 
of the cultural industries to take advantage of the alienability of the 
copyright interest to gather in as many copyright interests as they can.  
Since the transfer of copyright interests is a question of contract, the 
extent to which a publisher or production company will be successful 
in doing this is largely a matter of relative bargaining positions and 
market power.  Nevertheless, where this process of “gathering in” is 
successful, it has the consequence of uniting in the same hands the 
copyright interests in primary creative works and the copyright 
interests already enjoyed by those who invest in the distribution of 
those same works.
9
 
 
A second significant aspect of copyright law making it an important 
tool of trade and investment is its duration.  The long period of 
copyright protection increases the asset value of individual copyright 
interests.
10
  Thirdly, copyright’s horizontal expansion means that it is 
progressively covering more and more types of cultural production  
Fourthly, the strong commercial distribution rights,
11
 especially those 
which give the copyright holder control over imports and rental rights, 
have put copyright owners in a particularly strong market position, 
especially in the global context.  Finally, the power of the owners of 
copyright in relation to all those wishing to use copyright material has 
been bolstered by a contraction of some of the most significant user 
rights in relation to copyright works, in particular fair dealing/fair use 
and public interest rights.  This has been accompanied by significant 
                                                 
7
 Eg, duration of copyright in literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works is calculated according to 
the life of the author: see, eg, UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 12, & EU Copyright 
Term Directive 93/98/EEC. 
8
 See, eg, UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 11. 
9
 Ie. copyright in the sound recording or film, copyright in the typographical arrangement of the 
published edition, copyright in the broadcast. 
10
 See Towse 1999. 
11
 See esp the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs 
Agreement), Arts 11 & 14(4), which enshrine rental rights in relation to computer programmes, films 
and phonograms; WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, Article 7, and WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty 1996, Arts 9 & 13. 
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shifts in rhetoric.  Not only have the monopoly privileges of 
intellectual property owners become “rights”, user rights have become 
“defences” or “exceptions”.  Thus “users” are protected by 
“exceptions” to “rights”.  Nothing could better encapsulate their 
current vulnerability.  Allied to these characteristics of copyright law 
are the development of associated rights, in particular, the right to 
prevent measures designed to circumvent technological protection,
12
 
which has no fair dealing type exceptions and which, as we know now, 
is capable of a quite repressive application.
13
 
 
Viewed in isolation from the market conditions that characterise the 
cultural industries, copyright’s commodification of cultural output 
might appear, not only benign, but justified by both the need for 
creators to be remunerated in order to encourage them to create
14
 and 
the need for cultural works to be disseminated in order to reap the 
social benefits of their creation.
15
  However, viewed in context the 
picture is somewhat different.  Copyright law has contributed to, 
augmented, or created a range of market features that have resulted in a 
high degree of global concentration in the ownership of intellectual 
property in cultural goods and services.  Five such market features, in 
particular, stand out.  First, is the internationally harmonized nature of 
the relevant intellectual property rights.
16
  This dovetails nicely with 
the second dominant market feature, which is the multinational 
operation of the corporate actors who acquire these harmonized 
intellectual property rights while at the same time exploiting the 
boundaries of national law to partition and control markets.  The third 
relevant feature of the market is the high degree of horizontal and 
vertical integration that characterises these corporations.  Their 
horizontal integration gives them control over a range of different 
types of cultural products.  Their vertical integration allows them to 
control distribution, thanks to the strong distribution rights conferred 
on them by copyright law.
17
  The fourth feature is the progressive 
integration in the ownership of rights over content and the ownership 
of rights over content-carrying technology.  Finally, there is the 
increasing tendency since the 1970s for acquisition and merger in the 
global market for cultural products and services.
18
  Besides being 
driven by the regular desires (both corporate and individual) for capital 
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 See, eg: WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, Art 11; EU Directive on Copyright in the Information 
Society (2001/29), Art 6; US Copyright Act of 1976, s 1201. 
13
 See, eg, Universal City Studios, Inc v Corley, US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 28 
November 2001, and the discussion of this case in Macmillan 2002. 
14
 See, however, Towse 2001, esp chs.6 & 8, in which it is argued that copyright generates little income 
for most creative artists.  Nevertheless, Towse suggests that copyright is valuable to creative artists for 
reasons of status and control of their work. 
15
 For arguments about the importance of copyright in securing communication of works, see van 
Caenegem 1995 and Netanel 1996. 
16
 Through, eg, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886, the TRIPs 
Agreement, Arts 9-14, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty. 
17
 For a discussion of the way in which the film entertainment industry conforms to these features, see 
Macmillan 2002. 
18
 See Bettig 1996, at 37ff.  See also Smiers 2002. 
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accumulation,
19
 this last feature has been produced by the movements 
towards horizontal and vertical integration, and integration of the 
ownership of rights over content and content-carrying technology.
20
 
 
So far as cultural diversity is concerned, the consequences of this 
copyright facilitated aggregation of private power over cultural goods 
and services on the global level are not happy ones.  Through their 
control of markets for cultural products the multimedia corporations 
have acquired the power to act as a cultural filter, controlling to some 
extent what we can see, hear and read.
21
  Even after the pressures that 
have been exerted on it by the availability of music on-line, the 
corporate interests controlling the popular music industry are famous 
for their habit of selective release of their catalogue in national 
markets.
22
  However, it is not just the music industry where the 
corporate sector controls what filters through to the rest of us.  For 
example, the control over film distribution that is enjoyed by the major 
media and entertainment corporations means that these corporations 
can control to some extent what films are made, what films we can see, 
and our perception of what films there are for us to see.  The expense 
involved in film production and distribution mean that without access 
to the deep pockets of the majors and their vertically integrated 
distribution networks, it is difficult, but not impossible, to finance 
independent film-making and distribution.  This, naturally, reduces the 
volume of independent film-making.  The high degree of vertical 
integration that characterises the film industry, especially the 
ownership of cinema chains, means that many independent films that 
are made find it difficult to make any impact on the film-going public.  
This is mainly because we don’t know they exist.  The control by the 
media and entertainment corporations of the films that are made is also 
a consequence of their habit of buying the film rights attached to the 
copyright in novels, plays, biographies and so on.  There is no 
obligation on the film corporations to use these rights once they have 
acquired them but, of course, no-one else can do so without their 
permission.  Similarly, the film corporations may choose not to release 
certain films in which they own the exclusive distribution rights or 
only to release certain films in certain jurisdictions or through certain 
media. All these things mean that the media and entertainment 
corporations are acting as a cultural filter.
23
 
 
Closely associated with this filtering power is the tendency towards 
homogeneity in the character of available cultural products and 
services.
24
  This tendency, and the commercial context in which it 
                                                 
19
 Bettig 1996, at 37. 
20
 See also Macmillan 2006. 
21
 See also Capling 1996; Abel 1994a, at 52; Abel 1994b, esp at 380. 
22
 This habit was noted in a study by Ann Capling in 1996, who observed that while the global 
entertainment corporations owned the rights to 70% of the material in the global music market, they 
released only 20% of it into the Australian market: Capling 1996, at 21. 
23
 For further discussion of the issue of cultural filtering and homogenisation in the film industry, see 
Macmillan 2002, at 488-489. 
24
 See also Bettig 1996. 
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occurs, has been well summed up by the comment that a large 
proportion of the recorded music offered for retail sale has “about as 
much cultural diversity as a Macdonald’s menu”.25  It makes good 
commercial sense in a globalized world to train taste along certain 
reliable routes, and the market for cultural goods and services is no 
different in this respect to any other.
26
  Of course, there is a vast market 
for cultural goods and services and, as a consequence, the volume of 
production is immense.  However, it would obviously be a serious 
mistake to confuse volume with diversity. 
 
The vast corporate control over cultural goods and services also has a 
constricting effect on what has been described as the intellectual 
commons or the intellectual public domain.
27
  The impact on the 
intellectual commons manifests itself in various ways.  For example, 
private control over a wide range of cultural goods and services has an 
adverse impact on freedom of speech.  This is all the more concerning 
because control over speech by private entities is not constrained by 
the range of legal instruments that have been developed in Western 
democracies to ensure that public or governmental control over speech 
is minimised.
28
  The ability to control speech, arguably objectionable 
in its own right,
29
 facilitates a form of cultural domination by private 
interests.  This may, for example, take the subtle form of control 
exercised over the way we construct images of our society and 
ourselves.
30
  But this subtle form of control is reinforced by the 
industry’s overt and aggressive assertion of control over the use of 
material assumed by most people to be in the intellectual commons 
and, thus, in the public domain.  The irony is that the reason people 
assume such material to be in the commons is that the copyright 
owners have force-fed it to us as receivers of the mass culture 
disseminated by the mass media.  The more powerful the copyright 
owner the more dominant the cultural image, but the more likely that 
the copyright owner will seek to protect the cultural power of the 
image through copyright enforcement.  The result is that not only are 
individuals not able to use, develop or reflect upon dominant cultural 
images, they are also unable to challenge them by subverting them.
31
 
 
                                                 
25
 Capling 1996, at 22. 
26
 See Levitt 1983.  Cf Gray 1998, at 57-58.  However, Gray’s view seems to be that diversity 
stimulates globalization, which must be distinguished from the idea that globalization might stimulate 
diversity. 
27
 This is a concept that has become, unsurprisingly, a central concern of intellectual property 
scholarship: see, eg, Waelde and MacQueen 2007. 
28
 See further Macmillan 1996 and Macmillan 2004a. 
29
 See, eg, the discussion of the justifications for the free speech principle in Barendt 2005. 
30
 See further, eg, Coombe 1998, at 100-129, which demonstrates how even the creation of alternative 
identities on the basis of class, sexuality, gender and race is constrained & homogenised through the 
celebrity or star system. 
31
 See, eg, Walt Disney Prods v Air Pirates, 581 F 2d 751 (9
th
 Cir, 1978), cert denied, 439 US 1132 
(1979).  On this case, see Waldron 1993.  See also Chon 1993 and Koenig 1994. 
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As an example of this type of concern Waldron
32
 uses the case of Walt 
Disney Prods v Air Pirates.
33
  In this case the Walt Disney Corporation 
successfully prevented the use of Disney characters in Air Pirates 
comic books.  The comic books were said to depict the characters as 
“active members of a free thinking, promiscuous, drug-ingesting 
counterculture”.34  Note, however, that the copyright law upon which 
the case was based does not prevent this depiction only, it prevents 
their use altogether.  Waldron comments: 
The whole point of the Mickey Mouse image is that it is thrust out into 
the cultural world to impinge on the consciousness of all of us.  Its 
enormous popularity, consciously cultivated for decades by the Disney 
empire, means that it has become an instantly recognizable icon, in a 
real sense part of our lives.  When Ralph Steadman paints the familiar 
mouse ears on a cartoon image of Ronald Reagan, or when someone 
on my faculty refers to some proposed syllabus as a “Mickey Mouse” 
idea, they attest to the fact that this is not just property without 
boundaries on which we might accidentally encroach … but an artifact 
that has been deliberately set up as a more or less permanent feature of 
the environment all of us inhabit.
35
 
 
Coombe describes this corporate control of the commons as 
monological and, accordingly, destroying the dialogical relationship 
between the individual and society: 
Culture is not embedded in abstract concepts that we internalize, but in 
the materiality of signs and texts over which we struggle and the 
imprint of those struggles in consciousness.  This ongoing negotiation 
and struggle over meaning is the essence of dialogic practice.  Many 
interpretations of intellectual property laws quash dialogue by 
affirming the power of corporate actors to monologically control 
meaning by appealing to an abstract concept of property.  Laws of 
intellectual property privilege monologic forms against dialogic 
practice and create significant power differentials between social actors 
engaged in hegemonic struggle.  If both subjective and objective 
realities are constituted culturally – through signifying forms to which 
we give meaning – then we must critically consider the relationship 
between law, culture, and the politics of commodifying cultural 
forms.
36
 
Some remnants of a dialogical relationship ought to be preserved by 
copyright’s fair dealing/fair use right.  It is, after all, this aspect of 
copyright law that appears to be intended to permit resistance and 
critique.
37
  Yet the fair dealing defence is a weak tool for this purpose 
and becoming weaker.
38
 
 
                                                 
32
 Waldron 1993. 
33
 581 F 2d 751 (9
th
 Cir, 1978), cert denied, 439 US 1132 (1979). 
34
 Waldron 1993, at 753, quoting Wheelwright 1976, at 582. 
35
 Waldron 1993, at 883 (footnote omitted). 
36
 Coombe 1998, at 86. 
37
 See Gaines 1991, at 10. 
38
 See further Macmillan 2006. 
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These constrictions of the intellectual commons (or public domain) 
affect its vibrancy and creative potential.  They also tend to undermine 
the utilitarian/development justification for copyright, which is 
increasingly seen as the dominant justification for copyright protection, 
especially in jurisdictions reflecting the Anglo-American bias on these 
matters.  As is well-known, the general idea underlying this 
justification is that the grant of copyright encourages the production of 
the cultural works, which is essential to the development process.
39
  
However, the consequences of copyright’s commodification of cultural 
goods and services, as described above, seem to place some strain on 
this alleged relationship between copyright and development.  This 
argument may be illustrated by reference to the World Commission on 
Development and Culture’s concept of development as being about the 
enhancement of effective freedom of choice of individuals.
40
  Some of 
the things that matter to this concept of development are “access to the 
world’s stock of knowledge, … access to power, the right to participate 
in the cultural life of the community”41 – all ideas that are reprised by 
UNESCO in one form or another in its subsequent Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.  
The edifice of private power that has been built upon copyright law has 
deprived us all to some extent of the benefits of this type of 
development.  As Waldron comments, “[t]he private appropriation of 
the public realm of cultural artifacts restricts and controls the moves 
that can be made therein by the rest of us”.42 
 
 
5 Copyright as part of the TRIPs Agreement 
 
The impact of copyright on cultural diversity, which has been 
described above, was already well-established before the advent of the 
WTO in 1994.  The question that is now addressed is whether the 
establishment of the new multilateral trading framework under the 
auspices of the WTO has exacerbated the tensions between the 
protection of copyright and the promotion of cultural diversity.  In part, 
the answer to this question depends on the effects of the WTO’s 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs Agreement). 
 
If the arguments made in this chapter concerning the relationship 
between copyright and cultural diversity are persuasive then it is 
difficult to conceive of the TRIPs Agreement as contributing in a 
positive way to this relationship.  This can hardly be a surprise.  The 
conclusion of the TRIPs Agreement was formally driven by the United 
                                                 
39
 For a good example of a statement of this rationale, see the Preface to World Intellectual Property 
Organization 1978.  For discussion of this rationale, see, eg, Waldron 1993, at 850ff; and Macmillan 
1997. 
40
 World Commission on Culture and Development 1996.  For a detailed and persuasive account of this 
approach to development, see Sen 1999. 
41
 World Commission on Culture and Development 1996, Introduction. 
42
 Waldron 1993, at 885. 
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States.  Lying, however, behind the government of the United States as 
formal actor was a formidable coalition of US-based multinational 
corporate interests that were pushing for a strong system of rights to 
protect their trading interests.
43
  The upshot of this activity is a 
multilateral agreement the very name of which reflects its gestation 
and instrumentality.  That is, since the arrival of the TRIPs Agreement, 
intellectual property law has been explicitly configured as being about 
“rights” in relation to “trade”.  For those who would want to see 
copyright supporting a concept of culture and cultural products having 
a value in their own right, rather than having a purely instrumental 
value, some comfort might be taken from the fact that the agreement 
refers to “trade-related aspects” of intellectual property and thereby 
suggests that there may be some other aspects - but it is cold comfort.  
Not only is the TRIPs Agreement the dominant normative instrument 
of international intellectual property law, its location within the suite of 
WTO agreements means that it is an integral part of what is emerging 
as the pre-eminent system of international law-making.
44
  These two 
aspects of the TRIPs Agreement are, of course, intrinsically related.  
The systemic legal dominance and concomitant strong enforcement 
procedures of the WTO are a large part of the reason that the TRIPs 
Agreement has acquired the ability to define the parameters of 
intellectual property law discourse.
45
  While it is true that some of the 
most important steps down the instrumental/trade-related road were 
taken before the advent of the TRIPs Agreement, at least in the Anglo-
American model of copyright law, the TRIPs Agreement has provided 
an authoritative consolidation and normalisation of that approach. 
 
The copyright provisions of the TRIPs Agreement are, more or less, 
the same as those already laid down in the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, which formerly governed 
the international copyright regime.
46
  Therefore, there are not 
enormous differences between the legal framework of international 
copyright law before and after TRIPs.  Yet, the reification of 
intellectual property rights as trade rights, capable of enforcement 
through a system of trade retaliation, seems to be emphasizing certain 
aspects of the international copyright landscape at the expense of 
others.  This perception is reinforced by two further factors.  The first 
is that the TRIPs Agreement has shown itself to be a useful uniform 
basis upon which to negotiate bilateral investment treaties, which may 
strengthen the oligopolistic nature of the market for cultural goods and 
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 See Blakeney 1996, ch 1; and Sell 2003, esp chs 5 and 6. 
44
 See further Kennedy 1995 and Macmillan 2004b. 
45
 Although, as Sell 2003, ch.3 shows, important changes in discourse, such as the move from 
intellectual property “privileges” to intellectual property “rights”, began to occur much earlier than the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. 
46
 TRIPs Agreement, Art 9.1, incorporates Berne Convention, Arts 1-21, except Article 6bis (moral 
rights) by reference.  TRIPs Agreement, Arts 10-14 add some further obligations.  In particular, Arts 11 
and 14.4 broaden the exclusive rights of the copyright holder by the addition of rental rights in relation 
to computer programmes, films and phonograms.  However, neither of these provisions is unique in 
international copyright law: see WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, Art 7; and WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty 1996, Arts 9 & 13. 
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services.
47
  Indeed, wrapped up in this observation, is the further 
suggestion that the TRIPs Agreement might be even better 
characterised as an investment agreement than as a trade agreement.
48
  
(Either way, its capacity to nourish cultural diversity seems rather 
limited.)  The second factor reinforcing the nature of the change in the 
international copyright landscape is that the interpretation and 
enforcement of international copyright law is now in the hands of trade 
law experts, who are not necessarily experts in intellectual property 
law or practice. 
 
The WTO panel in US – Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act49 does not 
do much to relieve concerns about the effect of the TRIPs Agreement 
on the current trajectory of copyright law.  This case considers the so-
called three step test for the validity of national copyright exceptions in 
Article 13 of the TRIPs Agreement.
50
  It is of some importance in the 
present context because the width of exceptions to the copyright 
interest are key to the ameliorating the strength of the copyright holder.  
As a result of the incorporation of the provisions of the Berne 
Convention into the TRIPs Agreement,
51
 the TRIPs Agreement 
contains a range of exceptions. These include the general exception 
provision in Art 9(2) of the Berne Convention, which contains its own 
version of a three step test for exceptions.  The WTO panel in US 
Copyright decided that Article 13 of the TRIPs Agreement was an 
embodiment of the minor exceptions doctrine that formed part of the 
Berne Convention.  The panel does not explain why, if the minor 
exceptions doctrine was already part of the Berne Convention and 
(therefore) the TRIPs Agreement, it was necessary to repeat it in 
Article 13.  Thus it missed the opportunity to consider the possibility 
that Article 13 might add something to the existing body of law.  
Interestingly enough, buried in the somewhat objectionable arguments 
of the European Union in US Copyright, are the seeds of a suggestion 
as to what the “something” possibly added by Article 13 might be.  
The European Union argued that the requirements of the first step, that 
exceptions must be confined to “certain special cases”, required 
justification of the exception by reference to a legitimate policy 
purpose.  Such a legitimate policy purpose might, for example, include 
the need to balance the interests of copyright owners and users in 
certain cases.  This argument might be bolstered by reference to the 
objective stated in Article 7 of the TRIPs Agreement, which speaks 
about intellectual property rights being used in a manner which is 
“conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights 
and obligations”.  Not only was this Article ignored in US Copyright, 
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 See Drahos 2001. 
48
 Macmillan 2005. 
49
 US – Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act, WT/DS/160/R, 2000 (hereafter US Copyright). 
50
 TRIPs Agreement, Article 13 provides: 
Members shall confine limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases 
which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder. 
51
 See n 46 supra. 
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but the whole concept of copyright as a balance between rights and 
obligations was overlooked.  Once this balance is lost then copyright’s 
potential as a tool of cultural domination and homogenisation is 
unconstrained by any mechanism internal to copyright law. 
 
 
6 The Rest of the WTO 
 
The TRIPs Agreement, which imposes minimum legal standards with 
respect to national intellectual property protection, is somewhat 
aberrant in the context of the overall WTO stable of agreements.  This 
is because, unlike the TRIPs Agreement,
52
 the other WTO multilateral 
agreements are dedicated to reducing national barriers to trade using 
three main tools, which are the reduction of tariffs, the reduction of 
non-tariff barriers, and “the elimination of discriminatory treatment in 
international trade relations”.53  The elimination of discriminatory 
treatment is effected through the principles of national treatment and 
most favoured nation (MFN) treatment.
54
  Taken together these two 
principles provide that a WTO member state may not create a trade 
disadvantage vis a vis domestic goods and services for like goods or 
services coming from another WTO member state, nor may they 
discriminate between like goods and services coming into their 
jurisdiction from more than one other member state.
55
  The WTO 
agreements laying down obligations pursuant to the principles of 
national treatment and MFN treatment are subject to a range of 
exceptions allowing governments to take steps that would amount to 
breaches of these principles in some cases involving pressing national 
priorities, but the exceptions are limited and narrowly drawn. 
 
In terms of the picture painted above of cultural domination by private 
actors, a national government may wish to take steps at the national 
level to ameliorate the effects of the oligopolistic markets for cultural 
goods and services.  For example, it may wish to attempt to prevent the 
swamping of local culture as the result of the homogenising effect of 
global media and entertainment oligopolies by providing for quotas, 
local content restrictions or subsidies for local cultural production.
56
  
All these sorts of devices run the risk of falling foul of WTO rules.  
The Agreement which has the capacity to be the particular culprit is the 
                                                 
52
 The aberrant nature of the TRIPs Agreement is also manifested in its particularly uncertain 
relationship to the doctrine of comparative advantage that grounds the concept of free trade upon which 
the WTO is (very loosely) based: see Reichman 1993, at 175. 
53
 See the Preamble to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994. 
54
 In fact, both these principles make an appearance in the TRIPs Agreement, Arts 3 (MFN) and 4 
(national treatment), but their significance in this context appears to be limited to the requirement that 
that national legal entities (human or artificial) are all to be regarded as being alike. 
55
 Consistently with the WTO’s somewhat inconsistent approach, WTO law and practice embrace a 
number of derogations from these principles: eg, the GATS permits measures that are inconsistent with 
MFN: see GATS, Art II; & the exceptions for customs unions in GATT, Art XXIV, & GATS, Art V, 
involve inconsistencies with both principles. 
56
 That is, some of the types of devices envisaged by the UNESCO Convention, Art 6. 
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General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
57
  Due to the 
somewhat unusual nature of the GATS as a bottom-up liberalising 
agreement, WTO members are only bound by the liberalising 
provisions of GATS if, and to the extent that, they have accepted 
obligations in the relevant sector.
58
 There is not yet any general 
agreement or protocol on liberalization of obligations in the audio-
visual sector,
59
 which is the sector in which the cultural effects of the 
copyright-induced oligopolies are most keenly experienced.
60
  
However, some WTO members have undertaken relevant obligations 
and there is considerable international political pressure for more 
liberalization in this sector.
61
  Of course, it is correct to say that there 
continues to be resistance to undertaking liberalization commitments in 
areas affecting cultural policy and an argument might be made that one 
of the most important effects of the coming into force of the UNESCO 
Convention is to galvanise this political resistance. 
 
However, if commitments are made under GATS, perhaps as a result 
of overwhelming political pressure at the international level, 
derogations from the principles of MFN treatment and national 
treatment are allowed if they are contained in the relevant member’s 
GATS schedules.
62
  Otherwise, the regime is strict and the range of 
exceptions laid down in Article XIV quite narrow compared, for 
example, to the older General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT).
63
  As under the GATT, to make out an exception under the 
GATS it is necessary to show not only that the subject matter of the 
relevant measure falls within one of the specific classes of exceptions, 
but also that it complies with the so-called chapeau, with which the 
Article commences.  Specifically, Article XIV provides as follows: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
member of measures: 
(a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
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 Although the WTO General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures may also have a part to play.  The difficulties posed by these 
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 See, eg, Dunkley 2001, at 183-187; Macmillan 2002; Macmillan 2006; and Grantham 2000. 
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 See further Graber 2006, at 569-570; Dunkley 2001; Grantham 2000; and Hahn 2006, at 526. 
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 GATS, Art II & Annex on Article II Exemptions (MFN), Art XVII (national treatment).  MFN 
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63
 The GATT has had two lives: one as a freestanding agreement (GATT 1947); & the other as one of 
the WTO covered agreements (GATT 1994).  However, the general exceptions in GATT Art XX have 
remained the same throughout. 
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(c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are 
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement including those 
relating to: 
(i) the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or 
to deal with the effects of a default on services contracts; 
(ii) the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation 
to the processing and dissemination of personal data and the protection 
of confidentiality of individual records and accounts; 
(iii) safety; 
(d) inconsistent with Article XVII [national treatment], provided that 
the difference in treatment is aimed at ensuring the equitable or 
effective imposition or collection of direct taxes in respect of services 
or service suppliers of other Members; 
(e) inconsistent with Article II [MFN treatment], provided that the 
difference in treatment is the result of an agreement on the avoidance 
of double taxation or provisions on the avoidance of double taxation in 
any other international agreement or arrangement by which the 
member is bound. 
 
As is apparent, there is no specific exception in Article XIV that relates 
to cultural diversity or any associated concept.
64
  The closest one might 
get to this would be an expansive reading of paragraph (a) on the basis 
that measures designed to protect human rights may be regarded as 
“necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order”.  The 
WTO Appellate Body decision in US – Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
65
 which considered 
the meaning and application of Article XIV(a), suggests that such a 
result is possible.  In its decision the Appellate Body quoted with 
apparent approval the definitions given to “public morals” and “public 
order”, respectively, in the panel decision.66  According to the panel, 
the former “denotes standards of right and wrong conduct maintained 
by or on behalf of a community or nation”.67  The latter expression is 
qualified by footnote 5 of the GATS, which provides that “[t]he public 
order exception may be invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently 
serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society”.  
Taking this into account, the panel found that “‘public order’ refers to 
the preservation of the fundamental interests of a society, as reflected 
in public policy and law”.68  The panel found, and the Appellate Body 
agreed, that since the various measures in question were concerned 
with preventing “money laundering, organized crime, fraud, underage 
gambling and pathological gambling”, they were concerned with 
protecting either or both of public morals or public order.
69
  This 
reasonably expansive reading tends to suggest that measures necessary 
                                                 
64
 For a summary of the history of the debate in the WTO over the absence of a cultural exception, see 
Hahn 2006 and Graber 2006, at 554-555. 
65
 WT/DS285/R, 10/11/2004; WT/DS285/AB/R, 2005 (hereafter Cross Border Gambling). 
66
 Cross Border Gambling, Appellate Body, n 65 supra, at para 296. 
67
 Cross Border Gambling, Panel, n 65 supra, at para 6.465. 
68
 Cross Border Gambling, Panel, n 65 supra, at para 6.467. 
69
 Cross Border Gambling, Panel, n 65 supra, at para 6.486, Appellate Body, ibid., at para 296. 
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for protecting human rights would have a chance of falling within the 
exception.  Of course, even this very optimistic approach to 
interpretation raises the question of whether there is a “right” to 
cultural diversity, which falls within the general description of a 
human right.  As Section 2 of this paper sought to show, while the 
concept of cultural diversity appears to be located within the 
framework of the human rights covenants to the United Nations 
Charter, the consensus of opinion is that the UNESCO Convention did 
not create a new right to cultural diversity. 
 
Optimism about the WTO treatment of concept of cultural diversity in 
the UNESCO Convention must also be regarded as somewhat dented 
by the relatively recent WTO Appellate Body decision in China – 
Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for 
Certain Publications and Audio-Visual Entertainment Products
70
 In 
this dispute China sought to rely on the exception in Article XX(a) of 
GATT in relation to a range of measures for establishing a process of 
content review with accompanying selective bans on the importation 
and distribution of so-called “cultural goods”, comprising reading 
materials, audio-visual products and films for theatrical release.  As the 
Appellate Body related in its Report: 
China emphasized particular characteristics of cultural goods, 
including the impact they can have on societal and individual morals.  
It is for this reason, according to China, that it has adopted a regulatory 
regime under which the importation of reading materials, audiovisual 
products, and films for theatrical release containing specific types of 
prohibited content is not permitted.  To this end, China explained, its 
existing regulatory regime defines the content that China considers to 
have a negative impact on public morals and, in order to ensure that 
such content is not imported into China, establishes a mechanism for 
content review of relevant products that is based upon the selection of 
import entities.
71
 
In support of its contention that “cultural goods” have particular 
characteristics that impact on societal and individual morals, China 
relied on Article 8 of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural 
Diversity for the proposition that cultural goods are “vectors of 
identity, values and meaning” and that they “must not be treated as 
mere commodities or consumer goods”.72  China also placed reliance 
in this respect on the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.
73
  It seems that 
these references were largely perplexing to the panel and Appellate 
Body, both of which effectively side-lined them in favour of an 
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 China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and 
Audio-Visual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R, WT/DS363/AB/R, 2010 (hereafter China – 
Entertainment Products). 
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 China – Entertainment Products, Appellate Body Report, n 70 supra, at para 141 (footnotes omitted). 
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 China – Entertainment Products, Panel Report, n 70 supra 1, at para 7.751; Appellate Body Report, 
n 70 supra, at para 141n. 
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 China – Entertainment Products, Panel Report, n 70 supra, at para 4.207; Appellate Body Report, n 
70 supra, at para 141n. 
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approach that relied upon their recurring preoccupation with the 
meaning of the word “necessary” as it appears in the Article XX 
exceptions.  Perhaps this is understandable in light of the fact that 
China had attempted to use the UNESCO instruments to justify an 
arguably protectionist system of state censorship.  Under these 
circumstances, and since one could imagine a stronger case employing 
the concept of cultural diversity as a human right, perhaps not all 
optimism should be abandoned.  Nevertheless, there are some other 
problems that arise with respect to the utility of the public morals and 
public order exception in relation to measures designed to protect or 
promote cultural diversity. 
 
One problem, which plagues many of the WTO exceptions, is the 
restrictive interpretation that has been given to the word “necessary”.  
Early WTO jurisprudence interpreted “necessary” in the context of the 
GATT exceptions as requiring that there be no alternative measures 
that are consistent, or more consistent, with GATT.
74
  The status of this 
approach was opened to some doubt in a range of cases concerning the 
GATT,
75
 and by Cross-Border Gambling in the context of Article XIV 
of the GATS.  The effect of these more recent cases was summarised 
by the Appellate Body in Dominican Cigarettes.
76
 It noted that a 
measure is “necessary” to achieve a certain result if another WTO-
consistent measure is not “reasonably available”.77  The Appellate 
Body went on to point out that: 
[I]n assessing whether a proposed alternative to the impugned measure 
is reasonably available, factors such as the trade impact of the measure, 
the importance of the interests protected by the measure, or the 
contribution of the measure to the realization of the end pursued, 
should be taken into account in the analysis.  The weighing and 
balancing process of these three factors also informs the determination 
whether a WTO-consistent alternative measure which the Member 
concerned could reasonably be expected to employ is available, or 
whether a less WTO-inconsistent measure is reasonably available.
78
 
This re-appraisal of the meaning of “necessary” certainly lowers the 
bar for its application, although in relation to the question of the 
protection of cultural diversity there is some difficulty in predicting in 
advance whether other WTO consistent measures might be “reasonably 
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 See United States – Standards for Reformulated & Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R, 
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available”.  Unfortunately, not many further insights on this question 
can be gleaned from the Appellate Body’s consideration of the concept 
of necessity in China – Entertainment Products,79 other than the fact 
that this remains a central concern in the application of the exceptions. 
 
Another hurdle in exempting measures designed to protect cultural 
self-determination and diversity is posed by the chapeau to Article 
XIV.  As is evident on its face, it is concerned with the application of 
the measures in question.  Somewhat less obvious is exactly what 
standards that application must attain in order to comply with the 
chapeau.  This question was the subject of analysis in United States – 
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (the Sea 
Turtles case),
80
 in which it was considered in relation to the almost 
identical wording in GATT, Article XX.
81
  In the Sea Turtles case the 
Appellate Body acknowledged the difficulty in interpreting the 
expressions “arbitrary discrimination” and “unjustifiable 
discrimination” in the absence of any chapeau criteria for assessing 
arbitrariness or unjustifiability.  This is presumably the reason for the 
Appellate Body’s reference to the shifting line of equilibrium that must 
be marked out when applying the chapeau “so that neither of the 
competing rights [of WTO members] will cancel out the other and 
thereby distort and nullify or impair the balance of rights and 
obligations constructed by the Members themselves in that 
Agreement”.82 
 
Of course, one of the problems with this shifting line is that it makes it 
difficult to predict when a measure will fall foul of the chapeau.  It 
may, however, be concluded from the Appellate Body Report in Sea 
Turtles, that measures offending general principles of fairness 
constitute arbitrary discrimination, while those distinguishing between 
different WTO members without regard to their differing 
circumstances amount to unjustifiable discrimination.
83
  In considering 
whether either type of discrimination was manifested by the relevant 
measure, the Appellate Body considered both the application of the 
measure and the fact that the US had not attempted to negotiate a 
corresponding multilateral treaty obligation.  The emphasis that the 
Appellate Body placed on the latter factor suggests that a measure 
having extraterritorial effect can only escape being unjustifiably 
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discriminating where it is based on a treaty obligation.
84
  Theoretically, 
this sounds quite hopeful for measures based on multilateral treaty 
obligations.  Unfortunately, however, the UNESCO Convention 
contains little in the way of formal treaty obligations that might be 
sufficient to convince a WTO dispute settlement panel that the 
strictures laid down in Sea Turtles have been met.  In the end, the most 
likely effect of the UNESCO Convention is not on the operation of the 
exceptions to the GATS, but rather as a political device to constrain its 
signatory states from undertaking new GATS obligations that may lead 
to conflicts with the provisions of the Convention.  The extent to which 
it will be effective for this purpose is likely to be a reflection on the 
countervailing political and strategic imperatives. 
 
Looking at the WTO as a whole, it does not seem unreasonable to 
conclude that the TRIPs Agreement strengthens a copyright system 
that facilitates the growth of private oligopoly power over cultural 
output and the consequent cultural effects of this oliogopoly power, 
while other the WTO agreements potentially forbid governments of 
WTO member states to take ameliorating action or action aimed at 
correcting the resulting market distortions. 
 
 
7 The Rights’ Clash? 
 
So at the international law level one is left with, on the one hand, the 
swathe of human rights treaties and conventions that address 
themselves to rights of cultural self-determination and diversity, and on 
the other, the WTO.  As argued above, the combined operation of the 
WTO agreements appears to fly in the face of international legal norms 
valorising cultural self-determination and diversity.  Is it correct to 
describe the relationship between these two systems of international 
law obligations as clashing? If so, what is the nature of this clash?  
This paper concludes by examining the question of a rights’ clash from 
three different perspectives: (a) a normative perspective; (b) a formal 
legal perspective; and (c) a consideration of systemic governance (or 
political) issues at the international level. 
 
 
7.1 Normative questions 
 
7.1.1 Does free trade promote cultural diversity? 
The first of the issues raised by what is described here as the normative 
perspective addresses, in essence, the extent to which one might look 
so hard at the trees that one misses the wood. The UNESCO 
Convention specifically refers to the need for cultural interchange in 
order to stimulate cultural diversity.
85
  Might it be, therefore, that a 
trading system that is geared to promote trade in cultural goods and 
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services in fact serves that very end.
86
  Advocates of this argument 
sometimes suggest that the real problem with the WTO is the absence 
of multilateral rules on competition operating under the auspices of the 
WTO that might restrain the oligopolistic conduct. 
 
A possible problem with this argument is that it may underestimate the 
real spiritual parentage of the WTO in the doctrine of comparative 
advantage.  This doctrine postulates that resources will be most 
optimally allocated if each country concentrates on producing and 
trading those goods and services that it is best placed, for whatever 
reason, to produce.  It is true, of course, that all countries and societies 
automatically generate cultural artefacts and that probably no particular 
country has a comparative advantage in this respect.  However, some 
countries have comparative, if not absolute, advantage in the 
generation of the commodified forms of culture that are capable of 
being traded in the form of goods or services.  It is, of course, these 
countries that are swamping the global culture with their output.  
Dunkley puts a similar argument leading to rather the same result: 
Cultural embodiment in services such as audio-visuals reverses many 
traditional free trade assumptions.  For instance, Free Traders always 
argue against governments attempting to rectify a trade deficit in any 
one sector because this will be counted by a surplus in another sector.  
In audio-visuals, however, this could mean constantly being subject to 
someone else’s culture, and the idea that we should console ourselves 
with the thought of people in other countries wearing jumpers made of 
Aussie wool is a nonsense … In a world where even culture and 
entertainment are commodified and mass-marketed, free trade in these 
sectors is likely to mean that only countries possessing comparative 
advantage can have the privilege of retaining their national identities, 
which in my view is socially outrageous and should be resisted.
87
 
 
It seems reasonably arguable that we would need to move the WTO a 
long way away from its present form before we could celebrate its 
ability to create a vibrant and diverse trade in cultural artefacts. 
 
7.1.2 Does copyright promote cultural diversity? 
There is strong belief in some quarters that copyright protection is 
essential to cultural diversity and self-determination.
88
  Indeed, the 
provisions from the Covenants to the United Nations Charter are 
frequently cited as a basis for the granting of intellectual property 
protection.  This is particularly so with respect to the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, Article 27, which is used to found a claim to 
intellectual property rights for Indigenous peoples.  Similarly, as is all 
too well known, Article 27.2 of the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights is frequently used as a justification for the granting of 
intellectual property rights. 
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This question is tied up with the questions of both formal legal conflict 
and systemic governance and is further addressed below.  Perhaps, for 
the moment, it might be noted that if copyright is necessary for the 
promotion of cultural diversity and self-determination, then something 
has gone wrong and we need to look very carefully again at the shape 
of copyright law and consider whether there are parts that we might 
want to jettison or change dramatically – that is, the some of the parts 
considered in more detail in Section 4 above - if we want it to serve the 
objective of cultural diversity. 
 
 
7.2 Formal Legal Issues 
 
The origins of the UNESCO Convention, as a response to the absence 
of a cultural exception in the WTO agreements,
89
 make it clear that its 
framers understood at least some dimensions of the potential conflict 
between the WTO agreements and the UNESCO Convention.  This is 
most obviously the case in relation to the GATS and the GATT.
90
  
However, the framers of the UNESCO Convention seem to have 
under-estimated the potential impact of intellectual property rights on 
cultural diversity.  The Convention Preamble recognizes “the 
importance of intellectual property rights in sustaining those involved 
in cultural creativity”.  The reasons for this largely positive attitude to 
the role of intellectual property rights in securing cultural diversity are 
unclear.  The original UNESCO Declaration,
91
 upon which the 
Convention was based, included in its action plan the need to ensure 
the protection of copyright but “at the same time upholding a public 
right of access to culture, in accordance with Article 27 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights”.  The Declaration also drew a 
parallel in its Article 1 between biological diversity and cultural 
diversity.  In the light of this, it is interesting to note that the framers 
Convention on Biological Diversity were far more anxious about the 
role of intellectual property in securing biological diversity.  Its Article 
16.5 provides: 
The Contracting Parties, recognizing that patents and other intellectual 
property rights may have an influence on the implementation of this 
Convention, shall cooperate in this regard subject to national 
legislation and international law in order to ensure that such rights are 
supportive of and do not run counter to its objectives. 
By contrast, the UNESCO Convention seems to envisage no conflict. 
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 See further Hahn 2006, at 515-520; and Graber 2006, at 554-555. 
90
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 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, Adopted by the 31
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General Conference, Paris, 2 November 2001. 
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It seems possible that, if there is a legal conflict between the UNESCO 
and the WTO regimes, this might occur at either the domestic level or 
at the international level.  In order to deal with this, Article 20.1 of the 
UNESCO Convention introduces the concept of “mutual 
supportiveness” between various treaty obligations undertaken by its 
parties.  It goes on to provide that “when interpreting and applying 
other treaties to which they are parties or when entering into other 
international obligations, Parties shall take account of the relevant 
provisions of this Convention”.  All this is to occur without 
“subordinating this Convention to any other treaty”.  However, it is 
unclear how much impact this will have when the UNESCO 
Convention rubs up against WTO obligations.
92
  Perhaps, as noted 
already, its main effect will be to halt or retard the giving of further 
GATS commitments in sectors likely to impact on cultural diversity, 
such as the audio-visual sector.  In general, however, it seems likely 
that the concepts in Article 20.1 are not up to the task of resolving 
many potential conflicts.  This likelihood seems to be accepted in the 
UNESCO Convention, which squarely faces the question of formal 
legal conflict in Article 20.2, and provides that “Nothing in this 
Convention shall be interpreted as modifying rights and obligations of 
the Parties under any other treaties to which they are parties.” 
 
In considering the effect of Article 20.2 it should be borne in mind that 
if there was a formal legal conflict between the UNESCO Convention 
and a WTO agreement, the likely forum for the airing of the dispute 
would be a WTO dispute settlement proceeding.  This is primarily 
because the WTO has become the pre-eminent system for international 
dispute resolution.
93
  However, it is also because of the very weak 
Conciliation Procedure laid down in the Annex to the UNESCO 
Convention, which Hahn describes as “worth mentioning only as being 
reminiscent of the very early days of modern international law”.94  
Rather depressingly, Article 20.2 of the UNESCO Convention is the 
perfect let-out for the WTO, should it ever need it.  There have been 
occasions where the WTO Appellate Body has shown itself willing to 
take into account international agreements emanating from outside the 
WTO, although it has always found a way to ensure that this does not, 
so far as it is concerned, lead to a systemic conflict between the WTO 
agreements and international agreements that are exterior to it and that 
might influence the outcome of its deliberations.
95
  This is particularly 
easy where the agreements predate the WTO agreements.  So far there 
is no good evidence that it will be much more difficult for agreements 
that postdate the WTO agreements.  But any possible difficulty would 
be ameliorated by a provision like Article 20.2.  In any case, especially 
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after China – Entertainment Products,96 it is far from clear that the 
UNESCO Convention could ever lead to the sort of legal conflict with 
the WTO agreements that would require reliance on Article 20.2 by the 
WTO dispute resolution bodies.  This is because the UNESCO 
Convention requires very little in the way of positive acts from its 
adherents.
97
 
 
The clash, if there is one, is some sort of overall systemic conflict 
where two systems, viewed in their entirety, produce results that 
cannot co-exist with any comfort.  This is what is referred to in this 
paper as an issue of systemic governance or, more simply, politics. 
 
 
7.3 Systemic Governance/Politics 
 
It has just been argued that Article 20.2 of the UNESCO Convention 
would make life easy for a WTO panel should it ever be faced with a 
real conflict between a WTO agreement and the UNESCO Convention.  
However, it is questionable whether such a conflict would ever in fact 
arise given the fact that there is little in the way of positive obligations 
on states parties in the UNESCO Convention.  Assuming that, in 
normative terms, there is some sort of clash between the human rights 
system (including the UNESCO Convention) and the WTO system, 
then that clash is happening a space between the two systems - a space 
that has been neglected in the bifurcated system of international 
governance represented by the systems of public international law and 
international economic law.
98
  So what happens to it?  What is clear is 
that this as much a political question as it is a legal one (and maybe 
this observation applies to all questions in international law). 
 
How might or should this political question be resolved?  Generally 
speaking, describing a right as “human” seems to invest it with some 
form of moral urgency, which makes it incontrovertible or irresistible.  
The implication must be that when the human right comes into conflict 
with some other right, the irresistible moral superiority of the human 
right must be recognised and respected.  However, the position is not 
clear when we are talking about human rights and copyright, which is 
capable of being constructed as a species of human right.  Of course, 
we might deal with this problem of moral high ground by having a 
closer look at the human rights credentials of copyright.  This would be 
likely to show us that some of the most objectionable aspects of 
copyright are not mandated by a human rights approach to it.  Further, 
the reification of intellectual property rights as trade rights does little 
improve their human rights credentials. 
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Despite commentators who have argued to the contrary,
99
 it is neither 
sensible nor desirable to see the trade liberalization agenda as 
incorporating the human rights agenda.  Such an argument is, in 
Alston’s words, “a form of epistemological misappropriation”.100  The 
WTO is not an appropriate body to oversee the protection of human 
rights, including those relating to cultural diversity.
101
  This creates 
some difficulties in relation to suggestions that a link might be created 
by inserting a cultural exception into the WTO agreements.
102
  There 
are two other possible approaches: one is top down, and the other is 
bottom up.  From the top down point of view perhaps we need to think 
about ways to remake our system of international legal governance in 
order to avoid this no man’s land on which the clash – unregarded by 
the eyes of the law – between human rights and WTO law is taking 
place.  The bottom up approach is to start to change laws, like 
copyright law and international trade law, in order to reduce the 
normative conflict between these laws and human rights obligations.  It 
would be nice to conclude by remarking that if we are lucky these two 
approaches will meet in the middle.  However, the present dominance 
of the WTO system adds a touch of disingenuousness to such a 
comment.  Changes of this magnitude require a hard fought battle.  It is 
not clear whether the deliberations of the International Law 
Commission’s study group on the fragmentation of international law103 
will have much purchase on this issue or whether a more fundamental 
political and diplomatic upheaval will be necessary.
104
  However, the 
latter seems more likely. 
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